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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES R. McPHIE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
9163

-vs.JOHN W. TURNER, Warden of
Utah State Prison,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
PRELIMINARY STATEME.NT

On April 19, 1960, the Supreme Court reversed the
ruling of the Third Judicial District Court which denied
plaintiff McPhie's petition for habeas corpus. This
Court remanded the case to the District Court for such
further proceedings as are "deemed advisable and not
inconsistent with this opinion."
Respondent believes this decision to be of grave
and far reaching consequence and therefore petitions the
Court for rehearing based on the facts and points which
follow.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
· McPhie was sentenced to prison on conviction of issuing a fictitious check February 7, 1958, with execution
of sentence delayed to April 18, 1958, then thrice successively to January 9, 1959, at which time the District
Court committed defendant without hearing, no good
cause appearing to it for a further stay.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
McPHIE WAS NOT GRANTED PROBATION DURING
GOOD BEHAVIOR, NOR WAS HE ACTUALLY PUT ON
PROBATION AT ALL, EVEN THOUGH 'TEMPORARILY
PLACED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PAROLE
AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT.
POINT II.
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE HOLDING
OF DEMMICK V. HARRIS, WHICH ·COVERS THE INSTANT
CASE.
POINT III.
THE DECISION DOES NOT ·CLEARLY INDICATE THE
CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENDANT McPHIE.
POINT IV.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WILL NOW BE FORCED
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO PUT DEFENDANTS ON PROBATION WITHOUT ADEQUATE TIME FOR
EXAMINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
POINT V.
IN EFFECT, A DEFENDANT NOW WILL HAVE TO
BE FOUND TO HAVE ·COMMITTED TWO VIOLATIONS IN
ORDER TO BE IMPRISONED.
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POINT Vl.
THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE UTAH
STATUTE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
McPHIE WAS NOT GRANTED PROBATION DURING
GOOD BEHAVIOR, NOR WAS HE ACTUALLY PUT ON
PROBATION AT ALL, EVEN THOUGH TEMPORARILY
PLACED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE PAROLE
AND PROBATION DEPARTMENT.

:.McPhie was never given probation during good behavior. Therefore, he does not qualify under the holding
of the leading case, State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259
Pac. 104-±, 54 LRA 1463. That case, Respondent respectfully submits, should not have been relied upon by the
Court in arriving at its decision in Baine v. Beckstead,
------Utah ______ , 347 P.2d 554, upon which, in turn, the Court
seems to base its decision in the instant case.
In Zolantakis, the petitioner actually was placed on
probation during good behavior and his stay was revoked.
It did not expire. Here, on the contrary, the Respondent
has been unable to find anything in the record or minute
entries which even suggests such status was conferred
upon McPhie, nor was he committed until the actual expiration, by its own terms, of the extended stay date.
We submit that the actual order of the Court should be
the controlling factor in determining whether a probationary status was granted, and in the absence of an
order no such status should be assumed.
It was only a normal and proper thing furthermore,
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for the Judge to have the probation depart1nent assume
some supervisory control over the defendant. The court
said in the case of Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155
P.2d 170:
"Nor do we see anything in1proper in the
court's action in this case in requiring compliance
with conditions usually imposed on those placed
on probation during good behavior as a condition
to keeping in force a stay order until the date of
its expiration."
POINT II.
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE HOLDING
OF DEMMICK V. HARRIS, WHICH ·COVERS THE INSTANT
CASE.

The decision made no reference whatsoever to the
holding in DemmiJck v. Harris (citation .above) quoted extensively in appellant's brief. The Court, in Demmick,
held:
"But here we are met by respondent's contention that the use of the writ of habeas corpus
is restricted to the correction of jurisdictional
errors and errors so gross as in effect to deprive
one of constitutional substantive or procedural
rights. Thompson v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.
2d 91, opinion on petition for rehearing. We shall
assume for the purposes of this case that it would
constitute such deprivation of appellant's rights,
if Judge Ellett on November 28, the date of sentence, placed appellant on probation during good
behavior; and, thereafter revoked such order without notice and hearing.
Furthermore, we shall assume-and the proposition must be conceded-that the 1nere summary
4
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summoning of one on probation to the chambers
of the sentencing judge to be there cross-examined
concerning his conduct either before or after the
order granting probation, would fall short of according him the hearing the law prescribes. The
primary question, therefore, is: Was appellant,
on the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay
of execution and placed on probation during good
behavior.
The question must be answered in the negative. The order, itself, specifically makes the stay
one until a definite time. * * *
Whether one convicted of crime, and subject
to punishment therefor, should be placed on probation is a matter in such court's discretion. It
would be but salutary procedure: in the exercise
of such discretion for a trial judge who is doubtful
whether the granting of probation during good behavior is compatible with the public interest, to
make such investigation as his judgment dictates
as to the attitudes of the person convicted. ***"
The essential facts here are the same as in the Demmick
case, and the legal reasoning applied to them by the court
there applies here also.
POINT III.
THE DECISION DOES NOT ·CLEARLY INDICATE THE
CURRENT STATUS OF DEFENDANT McPHIE.

In its decision the Court has given no guidance to
the District Court as to McPhie's current status. In the
eyes of the law :
Is he on probation, or is he completely free~
5
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If he is oii probation, is it probation during good
behavior~

May the Court now hold a hearing to determine
whether or not his probation should be revoked and he be
committed~

There may be other in1nates in the Staee Prison
whose circun1stances parallel those of :McPhie. Thus, if
these must now he released upon petition, with no strings
attached, especially if they are beyond the right of the
courts to recommit them for violation of probation, the
result may well prove disastrous.
These questions are vital and Respondent respectfully submits that they should be answered by the Supreme Court in order that the district courts might not
be at a loss as to what, if anything, they may now do
with defendants.
POINT IV.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGES WILL NOW BE FORCED
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT TO PUT DEFENDANTS ON PROBATION WITHOUT ADEQUATE TIME FOR
EXAMINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

While Respondent agrees with the opinion of this
Court to the effect that District Court Judges are men
of undisputed integrity, cmnpletely loyal to their oath of
office, still Respondent believes that the majority decision has so limited the Court's discretion as to make
irnpossible an adequate investigation of whether a
person should be placed on probation or not. The Court
used as a reasonable measurement of time "a week or so."
6
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It is not clear how much more time a judge might have in
which to 1nake an investigation even where he expresses
that intention at the time of granting a stay to a date
certain.
Thus, judges may now feel it necessary in the best
interests of the public, where no adequate examination
can be made, to commit persons convicted of crimes
immediately without taking a chance that they might not
properly commit them at all.
POINT V.
IN EFFECT, A DEFENDANT NOW WILL HAVE TO
BE FOUND TO HAVE ·COMMITTED TWO VIOLATIONS IN
ORDER TO BE IMPRISONED.

In effect, the Court must now find the defendant has
committed two violations before he can be imprisoned,
unless the commitment is made in the original instance
or within whatever short additional time may be allowed
under the present decision. Such person first would be
convicted of the main charge, then he would have to be
granted a hearing to determine whether or not he violated
the terms of his supposed "probation during good behavior" before he could be committed. This is a result
never contemplated by the Legislature in enacting its
criminal procedural statutes.
POINT VI.
THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE UTAH
STATUTE.
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Our statute, 77-35-17, U.C.A. 1953, provides in part
as follows:
"Upon a piea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with the
public interest, the court having jurisdiction may
suspend the imposition or the executvon of sentence and may place the defendant on probation
for .such period of time as the court shall determine." (Emphasis added).
The reasonable meaning of the statute would seem
to be that the judge may suspend execution of the sentence to any date he may name, with or without placing
defendant on probation, and that the date he sets is controlling without resort to further hearing. The Court has
not seen fit to so conclude, however.
Respondent submits, furthermore, that the Court,
through judicial legislation, has added a limitation (precommitment hearings) not contemplated by the Legislature, and has impressed upon it the conclusive stamp of
constitutional due process.
It having done so, the field has been closed to the
Legislature and it may forever be denied the opportunity
of amending the statute to correct the situation.
The next portion of the above quoted section says:
"The Court 1nay subsequently increase or decrease the probation period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation."
So, even if l\IcPhie was on probation, the judge had the
right to revoke it, according to the statute.
8
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CONCLUSION
Respondent earnestly asks the Court to grant a
rehearing for the reasons raised above because of the
serious consequences the decision portends.
Dated this 6th day of May, 1960.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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